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TERMINATION OF INDIGENTS' PARENTAL RIGHTS
AFTER LASSITER: IGNORING COMPLEXITY AND
PROTECTING THE BEST INTERESTS OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENTS
Roy M. Sobelson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Of all the civil remedies a state may utilize against its citizens,
perhaps the most severe is the termination of one's parental rights.
Having been described as a "tearing of the flesh,"' it clearly repre-
sents one of our system's most egregious infringements on the fun-
damental rights associated with the raising of one's family.2 While
little uniformity exists among the states in terms of grounds for
termination,3 procedures, 4 courts utilized,5 terminology,' and stan-
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1. As stated by Justice Ingram of the Georgia Supreme Court:
There can scarcely be imagined a more fundamental and fiercely guarded right
than the right of a natural parent to its offspring. To terminate that right is to sever
that right for the future as effectively in law as if it never had existed. It is a tearing
of the flesh and it can be done by the court only under the most carefully controlled
and regulated circumstances for the sake of the child.
Nix v. Department of Human Resources, 236 Ga. 794, 795, 225 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1976).
2. Cases concerning unconstitutional interference with fundamental parental and marital
rights include: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life arbitrarily restricted by mandatory maternity
leave rule); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance law seen
as denying the Amish the right to raise their children in accordance with their religious
beliefs); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (law presuming unwed father to be unfit
parent held to deprive him of his "privacy interest" in his children without due process of
law); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute forcing parents to send chil-
dren between the ages of eight and sixteen to public schools held to interfere unreasonably
with parental control over the rearing and education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (statute forbidding teaching of foreign languages regarded as interfering
with right of parents to educate their children). For further discussion of fundamental rights
relating to marriage and the family, see infra text accompanying notes 60-65.
3. Compare the following state statutory provisions regarding the termination of parental
rights. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-4 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1982) states:
A petition to terminate the parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child
or a child in need of services must allege that:
(1) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six [6] months under a
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dispositional decree;
(2) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's
removal will not be remedied;
(3) Termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(4) The county department has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1981-1982) provides: "Where the evidence
in an action.., for custody of a child or for the appointment of a guardian of the person of
a child,. . . indicates that a child is deprived or in need of supervision, the court,. . . may
terminate parental rights in accordance with the provisions of this title .. " OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(d) (West Supp. 1981-1982) further provides:
(d) The term "deprived child" means a child who is for any reason destitute, home-
less or abandoned; or who has not the proper parental care or guardianship; or whose
home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the part of his parents, guardian
or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit place for such child; or who is in
need of special care and treatment because of his physical or mental conditions and
his parents, guardian or legal custodian is unable or willfully fails to provide it; or
being subject to compulsory school attendance, the child is ... absent from school
for fifteen (15) or more days or parts of days within a semester or four (4) or more
days or parts of days within a four-week period without a valid excuse, as defined by
the local school boards.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-246(d) (Supp. 1982) states:
[T]he court may terminate parental rights if it finds on the basis of clear and con-
vincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest and that one or more
of the following conditions exist:
(1) The child has been removed from the custody of the parent by the court for at
least one (1) year and the court finds that:
(A) The conditions which led to the removal still persist;
(B) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date
so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future; and
(C) The continuation of the legal parent and child relationship greatly diminishes
the child's chances of early integration into a stable and permanent home.
(2) The parent has been found to have committed severe child abuse against the
child two (2) or more times.
(3) The parent has been sentenced to more than two (2) years imprisonment for
conduct which has been or is found to be severe child abuse.
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
A petition requesting termination of the parent-child relationship with respect to a
parent who is not the petitioner may be granted if the court finds that:
(1) the parent has:
(A) voluntarily left the child alone in the possession of another not the parent
and expressed an intent not to return; or
(B) voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another not the parent
without expressing an intent to return, without providing for the adequate support
of tie child, and remained away for a period of at least three months; or
(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or
surroundings- which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child; or
(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged
in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child; or
(F) failed to support the child in accordance with his ability during a period of
one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition; or
(G) abandoned the child without identifying the child or furnishing means of
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identification, and the child's identity cannot be ascertained by the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence; or
(J) been the major cause of:
(i) the failure of the child to be enrolled in school as required by the Texas
Education Code; or
(ii) the child's absence from his home without the consent of his parents or
guardian for a substantial length of time or without the intent to return;...
(K) ... and in addition, the court further finds that
(2) termination is in the best interest of the child.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Repl. Vol. 1982) states:
B. The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child found by the court
to be neglected or abused ... may be terminated if the court finds based upon clear
and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that:
1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious and substantial
threat to his or her life, health or development; and
2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or
abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child's safe re-
turn to his or her parent or parents within a reasonable period of time.
Proof of any of the following shall constitute prima facie evidence of the conditions
set forth in subparagraph B 2 hereof;
a. The parent or parents are suffering from a mental or emotional illness or mental
deficiency of such severity that there is no reasonable expectation that such parent
will be able to undertake responsibility for the care needed by the child ....
W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(a)(6) (1980) provides:
(6) Upon a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of
neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future, and when neces-
sary for the welfare of the child, [the court shall] terminate the parental or custodial
rights and responsibilities and commit the child to the permanent guardianship of
the state department or a licensed child welfare agency.
W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(b) (1980) further provides:
(b) "[N]o reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substan-
tially corrected" shall mean that: (1) The parent or parents have habitually abused or
are addicted to intoxicating liquors, narcotics or other dangerous drugs to the extent
that proper parenting ability has been seriously impaired and the parent has not re-
sponded to or followed through with recommended and appropriate treatment...;
(2) the parent or parents have willfully refused or are presently unwilling to cooper-
ate in the development of a reasonable foster care plan... ; (3) the parent or parents
have not responded to or followed through with reasonable rehabilitative efforts of
social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies... ; (4) the parent or
parents have abandoned the child; or (5) the parent or parents have repeatedly or
seriously physically abused the child.
Arizona makes a parent's deprivation of his own civil liberties due to a felony conviction a
ground for termination when the felony "is of such nature as to prove the unfitness of such
parent to have future custody and control of the child." AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533
(B)(4) (Supp. 1981-1982).
The Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placement offers another set of guidelines
for the termination of parental rights. Katz, Freeing Children for Permanent Placement
Through a Model Act, 12 FAm. L.Q. 203, 216-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Model Act].
Section 4 of the Model Act provides:
(a) An order of the court for involuntary termination of the parent-child relation-
ship shall be made on the grounds that the termination is in the child's best interests,
... where one or more of the following conditions exist:
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dards of proof required at trial or on appeal," all states have some
form of termination remedy available. Most terminations, whether
made in conjunction with prospective adoptions9 or independent of
(1) the child has been abandoned...;
(2) the child has been adjudicated to have been abused or neglected in a prior
proceeding;
(3) the child has been out of the custody of the parent for the period of one year
and the court finds that:
(i) the conditions which led to the separation still persist or similar condi-
tions of a potentially harmful nature continue to exist;
(ii) there is little likelihood that those conditions will be remedied at an
early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future;
and
(iii) the continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes the
child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.
4. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-5-3 to -4 (Burns Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-
820, -824(c) (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-607 to -612 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,§§ 1103, 1131 (West Supp. 1981-1982). See also In re Public Welfare to Dispense, -
Mass. _ 419 N.W.2d 285 (1981).
5. District Court - IDAHO CODE §§ 16-2002 to -2003 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-820
(1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1102 (West Supp. 1981-1982); Probate Court - MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 210, § 3(b) (West 1981); Family Court - S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(4) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1981); Juvenile Court - WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.030(3) (Supp. 1982).
The Model Act, supra note 3, § 5 provides that "[t]he [Juvenile/Family] court has origi-
nal and exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship."
The comments to this section state:
Although the court structures vary, the Model Act does suggest that the juvenile or
family court or division within a district or circuit court system have original and
exclusive jurisdiction.
It is recommended that jurisdiction over termination proceedings be vested in a
division of the court of highest general trial jurisdiction which also has jurisdiction
over guardianship, custody, adoption, dependency and support, paternity, divorce
and other family litigation. In some states it may be the probate court. In addition to
having broad substantive jurisdiction over family matters, the court of original and
exclusive jurisdiction over termination should also have access to appropriate social
service resources and a clear-cut responsibility for related judicial administrative
matters.
6. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 232 (West 1982) (persons entitled to be declared free from
parental custody and control); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-820 (1981) (Deprivation of parental
rights); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-601 (1981) (parent-child legal relationship termination).
7. See, e.g., People ex rel. B.J.D., - Colo. App. - 626 P.2d 727 (1981) (preponder-
ance of evidence standard); In re Hoback, 95 IML App. 3d 169, 419 N.E.2d 713 (1981) (clear
and convincing evidence standard); WASH. REv. CODE § 13.34.190 (Supp. 1982) (varying
standards dependent upon the grounds for termination). But see Santosky v. Kramer, -
U.S. , 102 S. Ct. 1373 (1982) wherein the Supreme Court held that in certain instances
the "clear and convincing" standard is the minimum standard constitutionally permitted in
termination cases.
8. See, e.g., E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981) (definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made); In re Welfare of Solomon, 291 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 1980) (clearly
erroneous); In re Adoption of J.S.M., Jr., 492 Pa. 313, 424 A.2d 878 (1981) (abuse of
discretion).
9. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (Supp. 1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 710.41 (Callaghan
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such 0 are deemed permanent and absolute."" Furthermore, after
termination is final, a former parent loses the right to notice of any
further action regarding the child,' 2 and the inheritance rights of
the child are cut off.'3
This unique 4 proceeding was recently the subject of litigation in
the Supreme Court of the United States. In Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services,'5 the Supreme Court held that the due
process clause does not impose an absolute duty on the states to
provide free legal counsel to indigent parents in termination cases
Supp. 1981-1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.261 (West. Supp. 1982); and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-5A-2 (1976).
10. See, e.g. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-4 (Bums Supp. 1982).
11. E.g., id. § 31-6-5-6(a), which states that "[w]hen the juvenile or probate court termi-
nates the parent-child relationship, all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and
obligations (including any rights to custody, control, visitation, or support) pertaining to
that relationship are permanently terminated, and the parent's consent to the child's adop-
tion is not required." But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-11-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976), which provides
for a natural parent's right to petition for restoration of rights after six months following
termination unless the child has been placed in an adoptive home. The operative standard
for such a determination is the best interest of the child.
12. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-6(a) (Burns Supp. 1982) and MONT. CODE ANN. §
41-3-611(3) (1981); see also Model Act, supra note 3, § 18(c), at 246, which provides: "Any
parent whose relationship with the child is terminated is not entitled to notice of the pro-
ceedings for the adoption of the child ... nor has he any right to object. . . ." An interest-
ing twist which has developed in this area is the call by some parties for an "open adoption"
plan in which the natural parents retain the right to continuing contact and to knowledge of
the child's whereabouts and welfare. See, e.g., In Re Department of Public Welfare, -
Mass. _ , 419 N.E.2d 285, 287 n.3 (1981).
13. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Under the Model Act, however, the order divests the parent and child of all legal rights
"except the right of the child to inherit from the parent." Model Act, supra note 3, § 18(A),
at 246. In Roelfs v. Wallingford, Inc., 207 Kan. 804, 809-10, 486 P.2d 1371, 1376 (1971), the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that after termination of parental rights, the child is not
entitled to his natural parent's worker's compensation benefits.
14. 452 U.S. at 27.
15. Id. at 18. The facts of this case were indeed exceptional. In 1975, one year after a
North Carolina District Court had declared petitioner's son to be "neglected" and trans-
ferred custody to respondent, petitioner was convicted of murder and began serving a 25-40
year sentence. Respondent petitioned for termination of Ms. Lassiter's parental rights in
1978, alleging that she had not seen the child since 1975; had left him in the foster care
program for over two years; and had failed to show any effort to correct the conditions
which led to the severance of custody. Petitioner was duly served with the petition and
notice of the hearing. Although petitioner had been represented by counsel during the mur-
der trial, she had neglected to mention the forthcoming hearing to her attorney. It was
concluded at the hearing that petitioner had ample opportunity to obtain counsel and had
failed to do so without just cause. Because she had not averred that she was indigent, the
court did not appoint counsel for her. After the hearing the court terminated her parental
status, concluding that she had willfully failed to display concern or responsibility for the
welfare of the child, and that termination was in the child's best interest. Id. at 20-24.
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brought by the state.' 6 Holding that the right to appointed counsel
exists only on a case by case basis, with the initial decision to be
made by the trial court,1 the Court in effect adopted the same sort
of system used in Betts v. Brady, 8 which was later rejected in
Gideon v. Wainwright9 and its progeny. While the Gideon court
found a right to counsel in state courts inherent in the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution, 20 Lassiter, not in-
volving a criminal proceeding, was heard solely on due process,
fourteenth amendment grounds.2 ' The Court acknowledged in its
decision that its holding was contrary to the weight of authority in
lower courts,22 model statutes, 23 American Bar Association stan-
dards,24 and commentaries, 25 all of which provide for or advocate
the automatic appointment of counsel for indigent parents.
This article will examine the Court's reasons for such a holding
and will demonstrate that the Court's return to acting as a "super
family court"26 or "super legal aid bureau" 27 is based on a view of
16. Id. at 31.
17. Id. at 32.
18. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. The sixth amendment provides, in relevant part, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... and...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. The fourteenth amendment provides: "No state shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. See, e.g., Shappy v. Knight, 251 Ark. 943, 475 S.W.2d 704 (1972); Danforth v. State
Dep't of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347, 208
N.W.2d 259 (1973); Crist v. New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J. Super.
402, 415, 320 A.2d 203, 210 (1974), modified on other grounds, 135 N.J. Super. 573, 343 A.2d
815 (1975); In re Chad. S., 580 P.2d 983 (Okla. 1978); State v. Jamison, 251 Or. 114, 118, 444
P.2d 1005, 1011 (1968); In re Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973). See also In
re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972); State ex rel. Lemaster v.
Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1974).
23. See, e.g., UNIF. JUVENI E COURT AcT § 26(A), 9A U.L.A. 1 (1968) which provides, in
part:
Except as otherwise provided under this Act a party is entitled to representation by
legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings under this Act and if as a needy person
he is unable to employ counsel, to have the court provide counsel for him. If a party
appears without counsel the court shall ascertain whether he knows of his right
thereto and to be provided with counsel by the court if he is a needy person.
24. STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTms Standard 2.3(b) (Institute of
Judicial Administration - American Bar Association Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice
Standards 1980).
25. See, e.g., Catz & Kuelbs, The Requirement of Counsel for Parents in Neglect and
Termination Proceedings: A Developing Area, 13 J. FAM. L. 223 (1973); Note, Child Neg-
lect: Due Process for the Parent, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 465, 476 (1970).
26. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 52 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
27. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 450 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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termination actions which is, at best naive, and at worst danger-
ously misleading. It is this author's contention that the termina-
tion proceeding, with its very high risk of inappropriately destroy-
ing families, mandates compulsory appointment of counsel in view
of the courts' stated goal of doing what is ultimately in "the best
interests of the child.
28
In analyzing petitioner Lassiter's claim that due process required
appointment of counsel for her, the Court utilized the three point
balancing approach first enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge2 9 an
action in which the petitioner asserted a due process right to a
hearing preceding a cessation of Social Security disability benefits.
The Court, in Lassiter, first found that "the pre-eminent general-
ization"30 from all other right to counsel cases was that appoint-
ment of counsel was presumed mandatory only when the petitioner
risked physical liberty loss as a result of the action in issue.3 1 In
the face of this presumption, the Court then considered the three
balancing factors of the Mathews test: "[1] the private interests at
stake, [2] the government's interest, and [3] the risk that the pro-
cedures used will lead to erroneous decisions."32 The Court, which
found the parent's interest "commanding"3' and the state's "ur-
gent,"34 concluded that "[i]f .. . the parent's interests were at
their strongest, the state's interests were at their weakest, and
risks of error were at their peak, it could not be said that. . . due
process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel."3 5
However, three problems become immediately apparent in the
face of this type of analysis. First, the Court had never before used
the three part balancing test of Mathews as a collective balancing
factor itself to be weighed against some other "pre-eminent gener-
alization," or presumption, particularly one of such strength as the
Court accords the presumption that the right to appointed counsel
exists only when the litigant may lose his physical liberty. Second,
the Court drew this pre-eminent generalization from a line of cases
rejecting the right to counsel for reasons which extend well beyond
the focus on imprisonment as the sole factor determining the right
28. See infra note 155 and 158.
29. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
30. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 31.
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to, and the necessity for, appointed counsel .3  Finally, in focusing
on Ms. Lassiter's particular termination proceeding, rather than on
such proceedings in general, 7 the Court placed undue emphasis on
the lack of complexity evident from the record and thereby failed
to evaluate objectively the real and inherent risk of erroneous dep-
rivation of fundamental rights inherent in the termination process.
Perhaps many articles will or have been written 3 addressing the
questions of whether the Mathews factors are appropriately in-
voked in cases such as this and whether it is proper to balance
these factors against another presumption. Indeed, the question of
the relative strength of each part of each presumption or factor is
itself subject to debate. The focus here, however, is primarily on
three questions. First, is the Court's "pre-eminent generalization"
in fact supported by case law? Second, considering the structure of
the typical termination case, should not the courts take account of
the fact that a more formal proceeding with the protection of a
professional advocate may better safeguard the interests of both
the parent and the child? And third, do the complex substantive
questions involved necessarily create an unreasonably high risk of
erroneous deprivation of fundamental rights which could be sub-
stantially reduced by the presence of counsel?
II. THE PRE-EMINENT GENERALIZATION
Examining first the "pre-eminent generalization that a right has
been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physi-
cal liberty if he loses the litigation,'" 9 the Court's emphasis on
physical liberty seems to miss the point. It is true that all of the
cases requiring appointment of counsel were either criminal or at
36. See infra text accompanying notes 41-53.
37. The Court stated that "[t]he dispositive question, which must now be addressed, is
whether the three Eldridge factors ... suffice to rebut the presumption and thus lead to
the conclusion that the Due Process Clause requires the appointment of counsel when a
State seeks to terminate an indigent's parental status." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31. Having said
that, Justice Stewart, nevertheless seems to draw his conclusions from a review of the par-
ticular facts of the Lassiter case. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. This ap-
proach was severely criticized by Justice Blackmun in his dissent. "This conclusion is not
only illogical, but it also marks a sharp departure from the due process analysis consistently
applied heretofore." 452 U.S. at 49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. E.g., Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to Coun-
sel after Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAm. L.Q. 205, 206 (1981); Note, Due Process - The
Indigent Parents' Right to State Furnished Counsel in Parental Status Termination Pro-
ceedings: An Examination of the Supreme Court's Due Process Methodology - Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, 17 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 961 (1981).
39. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
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least quasi-criminal. However, In re Gault40 had already made it
abundantly clear that labels alone are not determinative. This re-
mains especially true for actions heard in juvenile courts, where
the majority of non-adoption related termination cases are heard.
Perhaps the most important thing to note about the cases denying
an automatic right to counsel, however, is not potential confine-
ment or the civil/criminal dichotomy. Rather, it is more appropri-
ate to focus on the nature of such proceedings in general to deter-
mine not only the possible consequences to the individual, but also
the degree to which counsel is really needed as a means of insuring
a party's meaningful participation.
In Vitek v. Jones,4" a case challenging the constitutionality of
Nebraska's procedure for involuntary transfer of a prisoner from
prison to a mental hospital, at least four Justices concluded there
was a right to counsel. Noting that a fundamental change in the
nature or curtailment of liberty carries due process implications,42
the opinion makes it clear that while the relevant inquiry is essen-
tially a medical one,43 the fact that these questions are psychiatric,
and thus subject to the "subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diag-
noses,"''1 justifies at least the requirement that the proceedings be
adversarial.4 5 Furthermore, the fact that the prisoner is thought to
be suffering from mental disease means the prisoner has an even
greater need for legal assistance.4' Thus, the Court in Vitek fo-
cused on at least two troublesome aspects of the procedure, its in-
herently complex and subtle nature, and the extent to which coun-
sel may be needed to aid the prisoner in responding to the
allegations presented by the state.
Even Gagnon v. ScarpelliV7 and Morrisey v. Brewer,48 cited by
the Court as supportive of this "pre-eminent generalization," focus
on the nature, consequence, and purpose of particular types of pro-
ceedings in finding no automatic right to appointed counsel for in-
40. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For a discussion which questions the validity of drawing constitu-
tional right distinctions based on the civil/criminal dichotomy, see Brown v. Guy, 476 F.
Supp. 771, 773 (D. Nev. 1979).
41. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
42. Id. at 492.
43. Id. at 495.
44. Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)).
45. 445 U.S. at 495.
46. Id. at 496-97 (White, J., dissenting).
47. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
48. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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digents. Gagnon, for example, raised the question of the necessity
of appointed counsel to represent a previously sentenced proba-
tioner in a proceeding to revoke his probation. 9 Placing great em-
phasis on the fact that the prisoner had already been sentenced
after trial,5" and that the sentence had been suspended by his
placement in a probation program, the Court held there was no per
se right to appointed counsel.51 The Court was apparently skepti-
cal of the inherent need for or likelihood of a "constructive contri-
bution by counsel. ' 52 Indeed, the Court said that the introduction
of counsel would alter the nature of the proceedings significantly,
causing the state to provide its own counsel who would likely pre-
sent all available evidence and arguments, and the role of the hear-
ing body itself would become "more akin to that of a judge at
trial."53
Such fears, of course, are not appropriate in the consideration of
a parental termination proceeding. Though these proceedings are
generally said to be conducted with the ultimate goal of acting in
the best interests of the child,54 they are already undoubtedly ad-
versarial,55 heard by a trial judge, and call for the vigorous partici-
pation of an attorney56 for the state and often for the child as
49. 411 U.S. at 778-80, 783.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 789-90.
52. Id. at 787. The Court noted a number of important factors about the probation pro-
cess. With respect to the relationship between probationer and probation officer, "[t]he pa-
role [officer] ordinarily defines his role as representing his client's best interests .... The
parole officer's attitude. . . reflects the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the pro-
bation/parole system... ." Id. at 784-85 (quoting F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KUamAL,
M. MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTIcE ADMINISTRATION, MATERIALS AND CASES 910-11
(1969)). The court reversed saying:
[W]e think that the Court of Appeals erred in ... [holding] . . . that the State is
under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for indigents in all... parole revoca-
tion cases.... [W]hile in some cases he may have a justifiable excuse for the viola-
tion or a convincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate disposition, mitigat-
ing evidence of this kind is often not susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to
require either investigation or exposition by counsel.
411 U.S. at 787.
53. Id.
54. See infra notes 155 and 158. See also Model Act, supra note 3.
55. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 42 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) and infra note 56.
56. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-535(e) (1974 and Supp. 1981-1982), allowing the
county attorney to intervene in termination proceedings to represent the child; IowA CODE
ANN. § 232.114 (West Supp. 1981-1982), which states that the county attorney or prosecutor
shall be appointed to represent the state in an adversarial proceeding. For a case raising the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, see In re M.T.P., 101 Idaho 280, 611 P.2d 1065
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well.57
Furthermore, the adverse consequences of an erroneous finding
in a probation revocation hearing are significant, but not irrepara-
ble, at least not in the sense that a termination is. While improper
continuation of a prison sentence is undoubtedly severe and can
never really be undone, collateral remedies and the possibility of
ultimate release are at least methods of preventing further harm to
the prisoner. As will be demonstrated, however, once appeals of a
termination are exhausted, the split of family and child is not only
irrevocable; by then it may well be of necessity because of the pro-
tracted separation and its effect on the parent-child relationship.
Finally, it is significant that by the time the revocation question
comes up, the prisoner has already been subjected to a prison sen-
tence, albeit one that has been suspended.58 Thus, the time when
he was most needful of representation, during the adjudication of
the criminal charge and sentencing, has already passed; and he was
obviously entitled to such representation at that time. In response,
of course, it may be said that the traditional bifurcation of termi-
nation proceedings into fact finding and dispositional phases
presents the same sort of situation. Yet, even though a judge may
be involved technically only in fact finding at a given time, it is
hard to imagine his being able to ignore the ultimate fate of the
child and the parent's actions as they relate to the child's "best
interests."
Thus, while the element of potential confinement is important, it
should not be the sole determining factor in deciding whether the
right to counsel exists. Obviously, the necessity for assistance and
the degree to which professional counsel could make a material dif-
ference should be considered.59 In this vein, it is important to rec-
ognize the possibly severe restrictions of one's liberty and exercise
of fundamental rights, 0 even in the absence of actual imprison-
(1980).
57. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 232.113(2) (West Supp. 1981-1982); KA. STAT. ANN. § 38-
821 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-607 (1981) (discretionary); the Model Act, supra note
3, § 51 (requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem). See also McGurren v. S.T., 241
N.W.2d 690 (N.D. 1976).
58. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 779.
59. This seems a particularly salient consideration in light of the Court's consideration in
Mathews of "the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards."
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
60. See Alsager v. District Court of Polk City, Iowa, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1976)
(discussing "fundamental rights" as they relate to vagueness and related problems in termi-
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ment or confinement. And this would seem particularly apropos in
a state's tampering with rights so jealously guarded as those en-
compassed in the catch-all "right to family integrity."61 Having al-
ready recognized such fundamental rights as the right to marry
freely,6 2 use contraception,6 3 direct a child's religious and secular
educational training,6 4 and terminate pregnancy at early stages,6 5
the Court should also accord great deference to a parent's right to
continue to control nearly every facet of a child's youthful
experience-
Thus, the Court's generalization, if one be needed to balance
against the Mathews factors, should take into account not only the
possible confinement of the one asserting the right to counsel, but
also the fundamental nature of the right or rights affected, and the
degree to which counsel could aid both the parties and the court in
coming to a decision that is both just and correct. Indeed, it seems
folly to ignore the fact that at least one study has shown that par-
ents who are represented are significantly more likely to prevail in
actions such as these than those who are not.66
Such considerations would seem to be even more appropriate in
a case where fundamental rights of a person other than the parent
are also affected. Thus, many states have recognized by statute the
parent's right to counsel, 7 many have also provided for counsel to
the child as well,' though the traditional thinking is that the state
nation cases). For a discussion on the relationship to child abuse statutes, see Sims v. State
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1190-91 (S.D. Tex. 1977), prob. juris. noted sub
nom. Moore v. Sims, 439 U.S. 925 (1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
61. In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), a pregnant unmarried minor challenged the
constitutionality of the Utah statute which required that a physician notify the parents or
guardian of a minor seeking an abortion. Emphasizing the protections afforded the relation-
ship between parent and child, the Supreme Court held that one consideration served by
the statute was that of "family integrity." Id. at 411. The Court noted that the "short shrift
given to the dissent to' . . . family integrity' runs contrary to a long line of constitutional
cases in this Court." Id. at 411 n.18 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1979)).
62. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
63. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
64. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. See Representation in Child Neglect Cases: Are Parents Neglected?, 4 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 230 (1968).
67. According to the Court, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia provide by
statute for the appointment of counsel in termination cases. Lassiter v. Department of So-
cial Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981). See also cases cited supra note 22.
68. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 232.113(2) (West Supp. 1981-1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
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represents the interests of the child in termination proceedings."9
Indeed, many statutes go even further by stating that the funda-
mental right to family integrity is to be recognized and that courts
should strive to keep families intact whenever possible. 0
III. THE LACK OF FORMALITY AND PROTECTION
The focus on the peculiar nature of certain termination proceed-
ings is especially important since one of the characteristics on
which the Court focused in its analysis utilizing the three prongs of
Mathews was the basically uncomplicated nature of the proceeding
to terminate parental rights.7' Often this lack of complexity results
from the Courts' preference that termination cases retain a high
degree of informality. But while the informality of proceedings
such as probation revocation hearings,72 school suspension hear-
ings,' 7 and commitment hearings7 ' may have led the Court to con-
clude that counsel is not always required, it is just such ostensible
informality that often makes hearings in juvenile courts so difficult
for parents to defend adequately. Informality may indeed cut both
ways, as that very label often seems to be a signal to courts at both
the trial and appellate levels that rules should not or need not be
as strictly construed or enforced as in more "formal" proceedings.
Parents may thereby be denied the right to invoke a variety of pro-
cedural devices and protections which would be available to assist
in their defense in more "formal" proceedings. Hence this obfusca-
tory label of informality often has dire consequences in parental
termination proceedings.
A significant number of termination cases are brought in juvenile
821 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-607 (1981) (discretionary).
69. See, e.g., State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971).
70. New York requires that the petitioner in a termination proceeding allege that the
authorized agency has "made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental rela-
tionship .... " N.Y. FAl. CT. AcT § 614(c) (McKinney 1975).
Indiana expresses its desire for keeping families together by stating a preference that the
courts and agencies employ the care, treatment, or rehabilitation that least interferes with
family autonomy, is least disruptive of family life, and imposes the least restriction on the
freedom of the child and his parent. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-16 (Burns 1979).
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.34.020 (1979) provides: "The Legislature declares that the
family unit is a fundamental resource of American life which should be nurtured. Toward
the continuance of this principle the legislature declares that the family unit should remain
intact in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary."
71. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 29, 32-33 (1981).
72. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
73. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
74. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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courts, 5 often as follow-up proceedings to findings that children
are neglected,"' deprived,"7 abused,78 or in need of supervision. e
Traditionally, proceedings in juvenile courts either are subject to
general rules of civil procedure" or operate under a system in
which the application of such rules is discretionary.81 Whether a
particular court is governed by traditional procedures may also
have implications on the right to have the proceedings recorded or
transcribed, as well as on the procedures for appeal.8 2
Court procedures may have other ramifications that hamper the
ability of a parent to prepare adequately for a hearing, cross-ex-
amine witnesses, or investigate the facts which may be the subject
of the hearing.83 In many termination cases, the governing proce-
dures either make no specific provisions for the right to discovery
through depositions, interrogatories, requests for admission and
the like, 4 or such rights have been specifically denied by state
courts.8 5 In at least one instance, a state court has granted the
75. E.g., Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531 (Supp. 1981-1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-320
(1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-4 (Burns 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.021 (1979).
76. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-283(A)(1), -283(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
77. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802(g)(1) (1981); UNnP. JUVENILE COURT ACT § 47.
78. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(6) (1980).
79. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1981-1982); see also IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-6-5-4 (Burns 1979) (child in need of services); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-602 (1981)
(youth in need of care).
80. Abell v. Clark County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, - Ind. App. - , 407 N.E.2d 1209
(1980).
81. Ray v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 81, 270 S.E.2d 303 (1980);
Blair v. Division of Family & Children's Servs., 135 Ga. App. 312, 217 S.E.2d 457 (1975).
82. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.110 (Supp. 1982), which provides that steno-
graphic notes of the proceedings may be required. For one case dealing with the differences
between juvenile procedures and those provided in other cases, especially in the area of
appellate matters, see In re T.P.S., 595 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
83. Representing a parent accused of child abuse may be particularly difficult in this re-
spect. Several states have enacted detailed provisions for the compilation of child abuse
reports. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-11-18 (Burns 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(9)
(1977); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 422 (McKinney 1975). Acquisition of information useful in
defending a parent from those reports may be stifled by provisions such as New York's,
which states that "a subject of a report may receive . . . a copy of all information ...
provided, however, that the Commissioner is authorized to prohibit the release of data that
could identify the person who made the report. . . ." N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 422(7) (Mc-
Kinney 1975). However, GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4302 (1981), does not even grant subjects ac-
cess to these reports.
84. But see IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-7-11 (Burns 1979), which provides that the law of
discovery of civil cases applies.
85. See In re Zappa, 6 Kan. App. 2d 633, 631 P.2d 1245 (1981); State v. Office of Human
Development, 397 So.2d 533 (La. Ct. App. 1981). Although not specifically ruled on by the
courts of Arizona, the Attorney General has ruled that the juvenile court may exclude par-
ents from access to certain information in their children's records. - Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen.
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right to discovery subject to the discretion of the trial judge, but
only in circumstances where the state was first found unreasonable
in refusing to supply any information whatsoever to the parent.8"
At any rate, it is clear that formal discovery in such courts is still
not considered significant enough to rise to the level of a right pro-
tected by either the state constitution or United States
Constitution.8
7
If the right to discovery mechanisms is not mandated by either
the federal or applicable state constitution, the participation of
counsel may make a tremendous difference in the ability of the
parent to counter the allegations of the state. An attorney would
certainly be more likely than a parent to have experience in using
informal methods of gathering relevant information, and this
would be true even in the absence of investigative sophistication
on the attorney's part. For example, he might still choose to move
the court for permission to depose witnesses, even though the ap-
plicable procedures make no specific provisions for such.
Further implications flowing, at least in part, from the informal
nature of the proceedings are found in the practically unbridled
use of hearsay in these proceedings. 8s Under several statutory
schemes, the court has either the option or the duty to order that
social investigations be made and reports thereof be submitted to
the court.89 While some statutes clearly provide that these reports
be furnished to all parties and their attorneys, 90 some do not.91
No. 179-230 ( ).
86. See, e.g., Ray v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 81, 270 S.E.2d 303
(1980).
87. See In re L.L.W., 141 Ga. App. 32, 232 S.E.2d 378 (1977).
88. Of course, the Court acknowledges that such was the case in Lassiter. See 452 U.S. 18,
32 (1981) and authorities cited infra note 94.
89. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-8 (Burns 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.425 (West 1981-
1982). See also Model Act, supra note 3, § 13. The commentary to section 13 states:
Subsection (a) requires that at the preliminary hearing of all involuntary petitions
the judge order a psychosocial assessment of the child's needs to be done by social
service personnel attached to the court or by an authorized agency, not the petitioner
or mental health agency, or an independent social work practitioner. If an authorized
agency is the petitioner, the court may direct that the psychosocial assessment be
made by some other agency or by an independent social work practitioner to give the
assessment the objectivity that is desirable. This section contemplates that social
casework and other clinical services, organized and administered by an executive
branch of state government, may be available to the court. If such personnel are not
attached to the court, the Model Act requires that the judge utilize other resources.
90. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-274 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
91. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-15(f) (Burns 1980).
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These reports, often full of hearsay which may or may not be ad-
missible under various recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule,92
are frequently viewed by the court with or without specific refer-
ence to them in the hearings.93 It is also clear that while many of
these reports have been held to have been admitted erroneously,
courts are reluctant to reverse decisions based on such reasons. 4
Rather, the improper inclusion or consideration of such records is
generally deemed harmless error.9
5
In addition, many actions, particularly those based on allega-
tions of abuse," are initiated by the fiing and subsequent investi-
gation of complaints by neighbors, family members, physicians, so-
cial workers, and others. Indeed, some such reports apparently are
made in accordance with statutorily imposed duties to report sus-
pected child abuse. While those reports which are made in good
faith9" generally protect the reporters with immunity, 9 the reports
are rarely subject to scrutiny by the party.100 Even when they are
open to review, the names of the reporting persons are often de-
leted.101 Thus, the use of these reports as evidence, or their mere
inclusion in court records, may leave a party facing a full range of
92. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(8). For a discussion of Minnesota's interpretation of such
a rule, see In re Welfare of Brown, 296 N.W.2d 430 (Minn. 1980).
93. In re Love, 50 IlM. App. 3d 1018, 366 N.E.2d 139 (1977) involved the parent's assigning
as error the trial court's consideration of private correspondence received by the judge
which further apprised him of the parent's situation. While the report was filed and ap-
peared in the appellate record, it was not subject to rulings on admissibility; and there was
no opportunity to cross-examine. The court relied on the presumption that a judge in a
bench trial relies on competent evidence, unless a clear showing to the contrary is made by
the appellant. Id. at -, 366 N.E.2d at 144.
94. See, e.g., In re M.A.C., 244 Ga. 645, 261 S.E.2d 590 (1979); In re J.C., 242 Ga. 737, 251
S.E.2d 299 (1978); In re Calkins, 96 IMI. App. 3d 74, 420 N.E.2d 861 (1981); In re Johnson,
214 Kan. 780, 522 P.2d 330 (1974); In re Watson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 277, 615 P.2d 801 (1980).
But see In re Florence X, 75 A.D.2d 942, 428 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1980); ilee v. State, 577 P.2d 908
(Okla. 1978); In re Welfare of Dodge, 29 Wash. App. 486, 628 P.2d 1343 (1981); Wyo. STAT.
§ 14-2-314 (Supp. 1982) (providing that social studies made for the court are not excludable
as hearsay).
95. See, e.g., In re Five Minor Children, 407 A.2d 198 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979); In re Wat-
son, 5 Kan. 2d 277, 615 P.2d 801 (1980); In re Johnson, 214 Kan. 780, 522 P.2d 330 (1974).
But see In re George G., 68 Cal. App. 3d 146, 137 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977).
96. See supra note 83.
97. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a(b) (1981); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A
(West Supp. 1982).
98. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38b (1981).
99. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-9-20(d) (Law. Co-op. 1976) states: "Any person who in good
faith makes reports pursuant to this chapter, or participates in judicial proceedings result-
ing therefrom, shall be immune to liability both civil and criminal for such reporting."
100. See supra note 83.
101. Id.
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accusations which are impossible to counter because of the inabil-
ity to cross-examine effectively, a right zealously protected by the
Supreme Court in many cases.10 2
Obviously, the presence of an attorney will not alleviate the
problem of trying to counter allegations made by persons unknown
to the parties. However, there may be exceptions to the rule that
such names are unavailable; and an attorney would be more likely
than a layman to have knowledge of any such exceptions. The at-
torney may also be more experienced at finding alternative ways of
obtaining the same information, or at least at limiting the effects
of information that cannot be adequately addressed.
Therefore, informality ' 03 and the often insistent repetition of the
admonition that termination proceedings are not intended to be
adversarial,1 0 4 punitive, 05 or complicated,108 merely serve to under-
102. In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), petitioner was discharged from his posi-
tion as an aeronautical engineer because of the revocation of his security clearance by the
Industrial Employment Review Board. Allegations that he was a security risk because of his
association with known members of the Communist party were presented and proven at the
hearing, with the board relying on confidential reports never made available to petitioner.
The Supreme Court, in discussing the importance of the right of cross-examination, said:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of
these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the rea-
sonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity
to show that it is untrue.... We have formalized these protections in the require-
ments of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots.... [This
Court] has spoken out not only in criminal cases, ... but also in all types of cases
where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny ... [U]nder the
present... procedures not only is the testimony of absent witnesses allowed to stand
without the probing questions ... but, in addition, even the members of the clear-
ance boards do not see the informants or know their identities. .. ."
Id. at 496-98. Obviously, the problem addressed by the Court is similar to that faced by a
parent who is confronted with a juvenile court's use of confidential reports, especially those
regarding suspected child abuse. As mentioned in note 83, supra, the use of such reports
may put a severe burden on a parent. In Levine, Access to "Confidential" Welfare Records
in the Course of Child Protection Proceedings, 14 J. FAM. L. 535 (1976), it is further sug-
gested that the reliability of the information in the reports may be compromised by the use
of non-experts who interpret and compile this information. The reports typically contain
"notations from interviews with family members, opinions and statements from various in-
formants and experts, and psychological and medical material. Although they are clearly
essential to the function of child welfare agencies,. . . child welfare records have been noto-
rious repositories of opinion, hearsay, and gossip." Id. at 536.
103. See In re Bredendick, 74 Ill. App. 3d 946, 393 N.E.2d 675 (1979); In re Hewitt, 272
N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 1978); Ex parte Label, 350 Mo. 286, 156 S.W.2d 37 (1941); State v.
Campbell, 325 Mo. 561, 32 S.W.2d 69 (1930).
104. For an extensive analysis of litigants' rights to procedures and protections that are
inherent in an adversarial proceeding, such as notice, discovery, right to counsel, and right
to a speedy hearing, see Singleman, A Case of Neglect: Parents Versus Due Process in
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score the lack of procedural safeguards often accorded parties
faced with possible deprivation of a substantial or "fundamental"
interest. That such safeguards should exist in a unique procedure
such as termination seems clear. In this regard, it is appropriate to
point out that Lassiter relied in part on the fact that not all termi-
nation proceedings have some of the less desirable characteristics
previously rioted.107 Yet, as Goldberg v. Kelly 105 made clear, "pro-
cedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent
in the . ..process as applied to the generality of cases, not the
rare [ones]. . ... 19 Thus it is necessary to consider some of the
factors which may, in the general sense, contribute to the risk of
error inherent in the process.
As previously pointed out, the lack of adequate discovery mecha-
nisms and the inability to rely on strict evidentiary rules to keep
out reports and investigative materials based on hearsay are just
two factors relevant to this inquiry. From the standpoint of repre-
sentation of the parent, these disadvantages stand in marked con-
trast to the procedural advantages claimants enjoyed in the Social
Security cases described in Mathews.110 There, the Court noted,
Child Neglect Proceedings, 17 ARiz. L. REv. 1055 (1975). In Note, The "Adversary" Process
in Child Custody Proceedings, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1731 (1967), the authors suggest that
custody proceedings, wherein infants are protected as wards of the court, are not truly ad-
versarial. Although the article focuses mainly on pure custody cases, it points out the diffi-
culties presented to a parent in the court's use of social investigations. The problems treated
here are similar to the ones created by a juvenile court's use of investigative materials in a
termination case. See supra notes 83-85, 89, 102.
105. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). For reference to the process as essentially preventive and remedial in nature, see Long
v. Long, 255 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 1977); In re B.E., 287 N.W.2d 91 (S.D. 1979).
106. "The respondent also contends that a termination hearing is not likely to produce
difficult points of evidentiary law, or even of substantive law, since the evidentiary problems
peculiar to criminal trials are not present and since the standards for termination are not
complicated." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 29.
107. According to the Court, the Department of Social Services was represented by its
own attorney; but there were no experts used, and the case presented "no specially trouble-
some points of law, either procedural or substantive." Id. at 32.
108. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
109. Id. at 344.
110. The Mathews case clearly focused on Social Security procedures in general as they
affected all similarly situated recipients, not just Mr. Eldridge. Indeed, the Court began its
examination of the due process implications by stating that "[wle turn first to a description
of the procedures . . . and thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the constitutional
adequacy of these procedures." Id. at 335. The Court then went on to describe generally the
disability insurance program, the statutory test for disability, the investigation process, and
the various administrative procedures involved. Id. at 335-39. Virtually the entire discussion
focused on the procedures generally employed as opposed to the specific facts of Mr. El-
dridge's claim.
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the inquiry is more focused,'11 relies mostly on medical reports," 2
and the recipient is entitled to see all of the reports made by the
various governmental agencies" 3 in preparing for his "nonadver-
sary"1" case. Thus, while Social Security claimants are apprised of
specific, regulated grounds" 5 for claims determinations and the
proof upon which the government may rely, the parent in termina-
tion proceedings is sometimes forced to guess at both the nature of
the government's claims and the supporting evidence.
But there are other more serious points about parental termina-
tion proceedings in general which serve to increase both the al-
ready heavy burden on the parent"" and the possibilities of mak-
ing a determination without adequate consideration of all possible
facts, inferences, and arguments that could be presented by coun-
sel. In much the same manner that many criminal statutes have
been attacked on constitutional grounds, many litigants have chal-
lenged termination or neglect proceedings statutes on the ground
that they are vague and therefore unenforceable. 1 7 While some of
these challenges have been successful," 8 the majority have
failed." ' Perhaps because of the inherently difficult task of defin-
ing abuse and neglect, these statutes must necessarily be somewhat
vague. Indeed, at least one court has implied that the emphasis on
the child's welfare and the necessary involvement of interests of
more than one party should result in a loosening of the standards
by which we determine how much vagueness is constitutionally
permissible. 20 Whether this conclusion is right or wrong, however,
111. Id. at 343.
112. Id. at 344.
113. Id. at 338.
114. Id. at 339.
115. Id. at 335-36.
116. A parent seeking to prevail against the State must be prepared to adduce evidence
about his or her personal abilities and lack of fault, as well as proof of progress and
foresight as a parent that the State would deem adequate and improved over the
situation underlying a previous adverse judgment of child neglect.
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. See, e.g., Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975),
aff'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976), in which the petitioners, whose paren-
tal rights had already been terminated, filed a civil rights action challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Iowa neglected children statute both on its face and as applied.
118. 406 F. Supp. 10.
119. See, e.g., People ex rel. V.A.E.Y.H.D., - Colo. - 605 P.2d 916 (1980); People
v. D.A.K., 198 Colo. 11, 596 P.2d 747 (1979); In re Brooks, 228 Kan. 541, 618 P.2d 814
(1980); State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971); In re V.D.D., 278 N.W.2d 194
(S.D. 1979).
120. See State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971).
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there is no question that these statutes, which necessarily incorpo-
rate many subjective standards, are often vague; and this vague-
ness has several implications for the parent.'21
First, this vagueness invites the courts to base decisions far more
on notions of morality than psychological benefit or detriment'22 or
particular actions by the parents. Perhaps because of this, these
statutes tend to be used most against persons of the lower socio-
economic strata, especially those on public assistance.'2" These
statutes often focus on vague notions of relationships, proper care
or control,12 4 moral upbringing, 12 5 depravity, 12 6 emotional well be-
ing, 27 and other factors that may not in any sense of the word be
associated with any specific parental actions or abuse of a clear
legal mandate. Although this may be both necessary and appropri-
ate, it nevertheless increases the possibility of leveling charges
against a parent who is unaware that his conduct could in any way
be considered inappropriate in the sense that it may lead to the
breakup of his or her family. At the same time, it decreases the
likelihood that a parent will be put on notice adequately or will be
able, in any true sense, to contend for his cause or change his be-
121. The court in Alsager suggested that this vagueness could possibly be cured by a state
law construction limiting it, but then suggested that the evil of vagueness is further com-
pounded by the use of a "substantial evidence" standard on appeal. 406 F. Supp. 10, 19-20
(1976). See infra text accompanying notes 143-45. The problem is exacerbated by the diffi-
culty of defining some of the relevant terms, especially "child abuse." As one author has
stated:
A paradox of legal definition is that the more comprehensive it [the definition] ap-
pears, the less it may actually permit to be achieved. All-embracing definition may
decay into mere description. Courts, especially when asked to intervene in protected
human relations such as exist between parents and child. . . , require precision. The
precisely-sharpened legal scapel may enter where the blunt-edged hatchet has no ac-
cess, and the tendency to legislate a rude hatchet attack upon abusive parents may be
self-defeating. Widely phrased formulae may become applicable to acts and persons
they were not intended or expected to cover .... The opposing risk to a court being
too hard to persuade of legislation's applicability to a specific case or incident,
namely that the court is too easily persuaded, is no more acceptable.
Dickens, Legal Responses to Child Abuse, 12 F m. L.Q. 1, 4-5 (1978).
122. See generally Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
123. For a discussion regarding the greater likelihood of a poor family's being subjected to
allegations of neglect and similar charges, see Kay & Philips, Poverty and the Law of Child
Custody, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 717, 733-39 (1966).
124. See UNIF. JUVENILE COURT AcT, §§ 2(5)(i), 47(A)(2).
125. Id.
126. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1101(d) (West Supp. 1981-1982) states that "[t]he term
'deprived child' means a child ... whose home, by reason of ... depravity on the part of
his parents ... is an unfit place for such child. .. ."
127. See UNIF. JUVENILE COURT AT, §§ 2(5)(i), 47(A)(2).
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havior in a way that is acceptable to the court.128
In addition, a parent is also likely to be faced with the problem
of addressing grounds which he had no intention of violating. 2 9
Clearly, the focus of a termination proceeding is not, and should
not be, on the existence of any malice or criminal intent on the
parent's part. Yet, in the case of a parent with an unconventional
or arguably immoral 30 lifestyle, the fact that his notions of child
rearing are well thought out and well intended 13 1 may be relevant
to the question of whether the child's best interests are being con-
sidered. It is entirely possible that conduct found violative of a
statutory scheme in one court may be seen by another court as an
innovative and thoughtful approach to raising a child.
Probably the clearest and most often cited ground for termina-
tion which may be contrary to the notion that intent is not re-
quired is the ground of abandonment. 13 2 Since many statutes avoid
the difficulty of defining intentional abandonment by substituting
certain specified lengths of separation of parent and child as
grounds for termination, several in essence retain abandonment,
128. In Alsager, for instance, the District Court identified what it saw as three inherent
dangers of vague statutes such as those leading to parental rights terminations. They are the
absence of fair warning of exactly what kinds of behavior are prohibited by the statute, the
improper delegation of discretionary powers of construction and enforcement to the courts,
and the undue inhibition of protected constitutional rights. The petition in Alsager stated
that the parents "substantially and continuously and repeatedly refused to give their chil-
dren necessary parental care and protection and. . . said parents are unfit by reason of
conduct detrimental to the physical and mental health or morals of the children." 406 F.
Supp. 10, 13-14, 18 (S.D. Iowa 1976). Cf. In re T.M.M., 267 N.W.2d 807, 813 (N.D. 1978)
(Petition did not provide sufficient notice to allow parents to prepare and participate mean-
ingfully in the hearing).
129. Obviously, the requirement of mens rea in criminal law takes this consideration into
account.
130. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3201(a)(2) (1981) provides for the termination of parental
rights with respect to a child who is "deprived." Section 24 A-401(h)(1) defines "deprived
child" as a child who "is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as
required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional
health, or morals.... ." (emphasis added).
131. In Alsager, the Court mentioned the problems that would face a parent who imposed
upon his child a rigid scheme of discipline which he felt appropriate to a proper upbringing.
406 F. Supp. at 18. Because of this problem, some statutes provide an exception which is
intended to prevent infringement upon the parent's right to act in accordance with religious
beliefs. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(d) (West Supp. 1981-1982) which states:
Provided, however, no child who, in good faith, is being provided with treatment and
care by spiritual means alone in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recog-
nized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof
shall, for that reason alone, be considered to be a deprived child ....
132. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(1)(A) (West Supp. 1981-1982); UNIF. JUVENIE
CouRT AcT, § 47(A)(1).
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constructive or real, as a primary ground for termination. Thus, a
parent facing a termination based on a specific length of separa-
tion, whether intentional or not, may be unaware of the appropri-
ateness of presenting reasons for the separation and evidence re-
garding its effects on the existing parent-child relationship. The
presence of an attorney would certainly increase the likelihood
that such an argument would be made by the parent.
These characteristics of vagueness, the lack of requirement of
any specific act or acts, in the absence of any specific intent, all
create potential notice problems affecting the adequacy of the rep-
resentation of the parental interests. What then becomes of a par-
ent brought into this legal process? What sort of allegations or
proof must he be prepared to meet?
These questions become all the more important in light of the
fact that the petition alleging grounds for termination usually need
not be very specific to warrant action by the court. And it is likely
that a parent will find a rather lax attitude on the court's part
regarding verification, 33 specificity,13 4 time limits,3 5 and other
133. In re Delaney, 617 P.2d 886 (Okla. 1980).
134. See supra note 128, which describes the language used in the Alsager petition. The
Model Act, supra note 3, § 9 commentary, in recognition of this problem, states:
Particular attention has been given to recent cases, such as Alsager v. District
Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406 F. Supp. 10 (1976), which held the Iowa termination
notice procedure violative of the parents' due process rights. Paragraph (6) of subsec-
tion (a) thus requires that the petition not only state the facts on which termination
is sought, but must also refer to the particular legal standard from Sections 3 and 4
that apply. These requirements are designed to meet the new due process demands
for precision in defining concepts like the quality of parental care and the meaning of
neglect .... The assumption of subsection (a)(6) above is that these requirements
for a new specificity in termination proceedings will prevent the issuance of termina-
tion decrees based on vague and undefined statutory generalities. Furthermore, com-
pliance with the requirement of subsection (a)(6) will facilitate the emphasis placed
by the Model Act on provision of right to counsel .... As a result of subsection
(a)(6), counsel for either parent or the child will now immediately know the allega-
tions on which the case for termination is based since these must be stated specifi-
cally in the petition. There is the further requirement that the effect of a termination
decree must be clearly stated. If these data, the information indentifying the peti-
tioner, and the nature of the relationship between the petitioner and the child are not
given, the court must dismiss the petition. Without such information parents whose
rights to the custody and control of their children have been challenged cannot ade-
quately prepare a defense.
135. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-817(a) (1981) provides that on filing of a petition to declare a
child to be delinquent or deprived, the district court shall fix a time for hearing which "shall
be within two (2) weeks .... ." (emphasis added). However, the Court of Appeals of Kansas
has held the statute to be discretionary, not mandatory, thus rejecting the argument that
noncompliance with the statute defeats jurisdiction. In re Flournoy, 5 Kan. App. 2d 220, 613
P.2d 970 (1980).
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technical aspects of these proceedings. But beyond that, the differ-
ences between these proceedings and many others seem to create a
system in which all cards are unnecessarily stacked against the un-
witting parent. For example, while some statutes provide a right to
jury trial,136 this is by no means a general rule and is probably not
constitutionally mandated.137 Furthermore, typical rules of privi-
lege and confidentiality are often abrogated specifically to allow
the use of testimony in termination proceedings. 138 Once the evi-
dence has been heard, the judge or referee is generally required to
make findings of fact1 39 and a decision based on a standard of pre-
ponderance of the evidence,14 0 clear and convincing evidence,14 1 or
other standards set by statute or case law.142 Moreover, the tradi-
tional appellate standards are even more onerous for a parent,
since many do not require reversal except upon a finding that the
decision is based on an abuse of discretion,143 is clearly errone-
ous,14 4 or other such strict standards.1 45 Nebraska, which allows a
136. See J.V. v. State, 572 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.422(4) (West
Supp. 1981-1982). But see MONT. COD ANN. § 41-3-607 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31
(1981).
137. Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this question, the Court held in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971), that a juvenile being tried on a criminal
charge in a juvenile court was not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. Singleman, supra
note 104, at 1084, takes the position that the lack of a jury, when taken in conjunction with
the fact that most of these proceedings are closed to the public, removes the hearings from
public scrutiny, which could impair the parent's right to a fair hearing. She suggests the
possible use of adivsory juries to cure the problem.
138. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-719 (1981) (waiving the physician-patient privilege),
interpreted in In re Zappa, 6 Kan. App. 2d 633, 631 P.2d 1245 (1981). See also N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7A-289.30 (c), -551 (1981).
139. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.117(1) (West Supp. 1981-1982). Cf. In re Rose Lynn G., 57
Cal. App. 3d 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976) (requiring such findings only if a request there-
for is made by the parent).
140. People ex rel. B.J.D., - Colo. App. _, 626 P.2d 727 (1981); In re Kimberly "I",
72 A.D.2d 83, 421 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1979); In re L.M.T., 305 N.W.2d 399 (S.D. 1981); Higgins v.
Dallas County, 544 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B) (Repl. Vol 1982). See also In re Tanya F., 111 Cal.
App. 3d 436, 168 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1980); In re Hoback, 95 IMI. App. 3d 169, 419 N.E.2d 713
(1981).
142. See In re Jessica, 121 N.H. 291, 429 A.2d 320 (1981); In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791,
424 A.2d 178 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 964 (1981). The Supreme Court, however, re-
cently held that the "clear and convincing" evidence standard is the minimum standard
constitutionally permissible in termination cases. Santosky v. Kramer - U.S. - , 102 S.
Ct. 1373 (1982).
143. See In re Adoption of J.S.M. Jr., 492 Pa. 313, 424 A.2d 878 (1981).
144. See In re Welfare of Solomon, 291 N.W.2d 364, 367 (Minn. 1980).
145. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981) (definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been made); Powell v. Department of Human Resources, 147 Ga. App. 251, 248
S.E.2d 533 (1978) (supported by any evidence); In re J.L.Z., 492 Pa. 7, 421 A.2d 1064 (1980)
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trial de novo in the supreme court, is clearly an exception to the
rule. 146
These characteristics of the general scheme of termination stat-
utes have at times been justified on the grounds that these pro-
ceedings are intended to be informal or flexible 147 or that all tech-
nical rules and rights are subordinate to the best interests of the
child. 148 All, however, are relevant to a critical analysis of the
Court's use of the third factor in the Mathews test, specifically, the
risk of erroneous deprivation.
IV. RISKS CREATED BY THE INTRINSIC COMPLEXITY OF THE
INQUIRY
It is essential to make further note of the situation in which the
Mathews Court made the risk of erroneous deprivation an impor-
tant factor. In Mathews, the Court had to decide whether a disa-
bility payment recipient whose benefits were being terminated was
entitled to a hearing before the termination took place.149 The Su-
preme Court emphasized several important elements of the chal-
lenged proceedings. First, it noted that the sole interest of the re-
cipient was in the "uninterrupted receipt of his benefits" 150 and
that "[i]n the event of wrongful termination, other government
(supported by competent evidence); People ex rel. P.M., 299 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1980) (a firm
conviction that a mistake has been made); In re Willis, 157 W.Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129
(1973) (contrary to the plain preponderance of the whole evidence).
146. See In re Carlson, 207 Neb. 540, 299 N.W.2d 760 (1980).
147. See, e.g., State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971).
148. In re David, - R.I. -, -, 427 A.2d 795, 800-01 (1981) was a case in which
the father whose rights were terminated asserted that the Rhode Island statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague and that the standard of proof required was "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Regarding the standard of proof assertion, the court stated: "[W]e must be careful,
in erecting an edifice of impenetrable procedural safeguards in favor of parents, that we do
not neglect to protect the interests of children who are often the helpless victims of parental
neglect or abuse." Id. at _, 427 A.2d at 800. In rejecting appellant's claim of vagueness,
the court held:
[T]he person whose conduct was alleged to have violated the statutory standard has
reasonable notice of such violation in the context in which the issue arose .... This
is not a matter merely of interference with a private right by a state agency. The
process involves the determination of the right of a minor child to . . . spend the
remainder of his or her childhood in a family setting in which the child may grow and
thrive.... [W]e have long espoused the position that the rights of parents are a
most essential consideration, but we further recognize that the best interests and wel-
fare of the child outweigh all other considerations.
Id. at -, 427 A.2d at 801 (citations omitted).
149. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).
150. Id. at 340.
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benefits [would] .. .become available.' 1 51 Furthermore, if the ini-
tial decision was deemed incorrect, the recipient was "entitled to
retroactive payments."'1 52
The emphasis on these facts makes it clear that the "risk of erro-
neous deprivation"'5'  comprises at least two components. First,
there is the question of reliability of procedures, that is, whether
the procedures are adequate to insure a high degree of predictabil-
ity and correctness in the decision making process. The second is
the question of whether an erroneous deprivation will work a sub-
stantial or irremediable harm upon the rights of the party in-
volved. On both of these questions, the Court in Mathews found
the procedures and the consequences to be acceptable.'" It is pre-
cisely because of these two facets of risk, however, that Lassiter
seems to misweigh the Mathews factors.
Despite the lack of uniformity in the various procedures and vo-
cabulary, almost all termination of parental rights proceedings fo-
cus primarily on the "best interests of the child."' 55 This standard,
unlike the question of a worker's "physical and mental condi-
tion" 5 which the Mathews Court described as "a sharply focused
and easily documented decision,"'157 is a very complex and difficult
one to apply. 5 It is made even more complicated since the child's
151. Id. at 342.
152. Id. at 340.
153. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 352 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
154. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340.
155. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-2(a)(3) (Burns 1982) requires that a petition for termi-
nation include an allegation that termination is in the child's best interests. The "best inter-
ests" test has been criticized on a number of grounds, not the least of which is its tendency
to be used as an excuse for evaluating every aspect of a parent's private life and often as a
tool for the unwarranted infringement upon a parent's right to exercise his religion, associ-
ate freely with others, and travel as he wishes. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.426(2) (West Supp.
1981-1982) states that "[t]he best interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor consid-
ered by the court in determining the disposition of all proceedings under this subchapter."
See also Boskey & McCue, Alternative Standards for the Termination of Parental Rights,
9 Snros HALL L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1978); Comment, Child Custody: Best Interests of the Chil-
dren v. Constitutional Rights of Parents, 81 DicK. L. REv. 733 (1977).
156. 424 U.S. at 343.
157. Id.
158. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pt. 1), 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423 (1964), in which
the authors discuss the competition between two of these principles - making a custody
award in accordance with the best interests of the child, yet not depriving a natural parent,
especially a mother, of custody unless "unfit." The writers suggest that courts often consider
criteria which are inadequate, in that these criteria "fall to force courts to consider essential
factual, social, medical, and psychological information." Id. at 438. See also Alternatives to
"Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives], in which the author states that the "proper cus-
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best interests may have already been sharply interfered with by
previous placement in foster homes,"'9 shifting from one institution
or home to another,6 0 lack of adequate counseling,161 and a host of
other possible problems. Nevertheless, the "best interests" stan-
dard seems to prevail. Thus, the question which must first be
asked about the risk of erroneous deprivation is whether proce-
dures generally employed in termination cases have the necessary
indicia of reliability and predictability to warrant the Supreme
Court's refusal to hold that the right to appointed counsel exists in
all such cases brought by the state. As such, it is incumbent upon
us to examine the various complexities of the decisions made in
the best interests of the child and to ask whether the presence of
an attorney as a general rule can substantially reduce the risk of
erroneous deprivation.
When the Court notes that "the complexity of the proceeding
and the incapacity of the uncounseled parent could be, but would
not always be, great enough to make the risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation of the parent's rights insupportably high,1 0 2 it takes too
restrictive a view of the nature of such proceedings. Evidence of
tody goal" - maximizing the interests of the child - can be furthered by the court's con-
centrating on the psychological well-being of the child. Id. at 156-57. Moreover, it is sug-
gested that continued emphasis on the
parental right doctrine and the procedural devices favoring the natural parent are
defensible in these terms only by an intuitive but incomplete psychological general-
ization that a "blood tie" between parent and child will eventually result in more and
better love and, hence, in a more adequate psychological development of the child.
Id. at 157-58 (citations omitted).
While the articles focus generally on disputes between parents and third parties, they
nevertheless point up the difficulties posed by the construction and use of such seemingly
simple tests as "the best interests of the child" or "the parental right." One response to this
course has been the proposal of a test known as the "least detrimental available alternative
for safeguarding the child's growth and development." J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53-64 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN].
159. At least one study of a Massachusetts foster care program indicates that more often
than not, placement outside the child's home is permanent. The study also indicated that
children in foster care rarely received adequate counseling and that very little was done to
prepare or support foster parents. A.R. GRUBER, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: DESTITUTE, NEG-
LECTED... BETRAYED 176 (1978). This could prove to be especially difficult for a parent in a
state where a parent with a child in foster care is said to have an affirmative duty to work
towards the eventual return of the child to his care. See In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383
A.2d 1228, 1233 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
160. For a severe example, see In re Zappa, 6 Kan. App. 2d 633, 631 P.2d 1245 (1981). For
a discussion and quantification of such trends, see Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A
Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68
GEo. L.J. 213, 224 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Family Integrity].
161. See supra note 159.
162. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
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the fact that these proceedings will not always be complicated is
partly found in Lassiter itself. No experts testified at the hearing
and the "case presented no specially troublesome points of
law. .... -"'e Likewise, the Court found that hearsay evidence was
admitted.1 6 4 Furthermore, it is obvious from the transcript that
Ms. Lassiter did not have even a rudimentary understanding of the
nature or purpose of cross-examination.16 5 Because the Court
found that such lack of complexity may exist in many cases, it con-
cluded that it is more sensible to judge each case on its own
merits."6 '
There are several inherent difficulties with this approach. First,
it is virtually impossible for the trial judge to recognize the possi-
ble legal or evidentiary problems until after the evidence has been
presented; and it is obviously too late then to decide that counsel
is needed to help the parent. As the dissent notes, "[d]etermining
the difference legal representation would have made becomes pos-
sible only through imagination, investigation, and legal research fo-
cused on the particular case. ''16 7 Furthermore, to assume that such
anticipation consists solely of recognizing and utilizing traditional
theories and approaches previously employed by statutes, cases, or
commentary, makes the common law system appear to be virtually
ignorant of change and development.
Perhaps even more importantly, however, there is an added bur-
den placed on a court. While the system is an adversarial one in
which the interests or desires of the child, the parents (or two par-
ents in conflict), and the state, may all be quite different, the juve-
nile court is generally admonished to act in accordance with the
best interests of the child. In order to achieve this end, a court
must sometimes compare the consequences of returning the child
to his home with those of lengthening an extant foster care place-
ment or severing the parent-child relationship entirely.6 8 This
comparison may, and should, be an enormously complicated proce-
dure, especially given the plethora of psychological, sociological,
163. Id. at 32.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 54-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 32.
167. Id. at 51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.426(3)(f) (West Supp. 1981-1982) (requiring that the
court consider whether termination will enable the child to enter into a more stable family
relationship, taking into account "the conditions of the child's current placement, the likeli-
hood of future placements, and the results of prior placements").
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psychiatric, and legal literature and thought on these subjects.
For example, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit have suggested in
their controversial6 9 book Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child170 that the courts adopt at least three guidelines that should
always be taken into account in making placement decisions. While
these guidelines are neither universally accepted nor necessarily
exhaustive of all appropriate considerations, they nevertheless pro-
vide at least one framework for decision which has been used by
some courts.
17 1
169. The word controversial is used advisedly. While the book was cited by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 841
(1977), not all courts utilizing the book have enthusiastically embraced all of its premises or
implications. One of the most outspoken critics, for instance, has been Judge Nanette
Dembitz of the New York Family Court. With respect to the authors' attempt to provide a
psychoanalytically based theory to produce useful guidelines to govern judicial decisions re-
garding placement, she has said that "[t]he promise is seductive but impossible. ... "
Dembitz, Beyond Any Discipline's Competence (Book Review), 83 YALE L.J. 1304, 1304
(1979). Nevertheless, she does concede that the book does "make several persuasive points
concerning child care controversies." Id. For a rather comprehensive survey of the book's
reception by lawyers, social scientists, and judges of various courts, see Crouch, An Essay on
the Critical and Judicial Reception of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 13 FAm. L.Q.
49 (1979).
170. GOLDSTEiN, supra note 158. The primary focus of the book is the use of the "psycho-
logical parenthood" theories, especially as such theories may lead to decisions which conflict
with the rights of the biological parent. According to the authors,
for the child, the physical realties of his conception and birth are not the direct cause
of his emotional attachment. This attachment results from day-to-day attention to
his needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation. Only a
parent who provides for these needs will build a psychological relationship to the
child on the basis of the biological one and will become his "psychological parent" in
whose care the child can feel valued and wanted. An absent biological parent will
remain, or tend to become, a stranger.
Id. at 17. Furthermore they state:
Whether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child is based thus on day-
to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The role can be fulfilled
either by a biological parent or by an adoptive parent or by any other caring adult -
but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship
to the child may be.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
In order to explain more fully concepts utilized by them and to make implementation of
such by a legislature easier, the authors suggest certain provisions for a model child place-
ment statute. Id. at 97-101. Paragraph 10.6 of this model statute defines the "least detri-
mental available alternative" as "that child placement and procedure for child placement
which maximizes, in accord with the child's sense of time . . ., the child's opportunity for
being wanted ... and for maintaining on a continuous, unconditional, and permanent basis
a relationship with at least one adult who is or will become the child's psychological par-
ent. .. ." Id. at 99. The authors prefer this as a substitute for the test which looks only to
the best interests of the child. Id. at 53-64.
171. One of the first cases to embrace similar types of theories was Painter v. Bannister,
258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156-58 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966), a decision
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First, the authors suggest that placement decisions should safe-
guard the child's need for continuity of relationships.172 Even this
seemingly simple guideline is fraught with potential difficulties in
application. Disruptions in continuity tend to have different conse-
quences at different ages.1 3 Changes affecting continuity may have
which denied a father custody in a habeas corpus proceeding against his wife's parents after
her death. Though the father was apparently fit, the court found that custody by the grand-
parents was in the best interests of the child. The decision has been described as "arguably
defensible in light of the psychological testimony relating specifically to the instability that
would be caused by a change in custody." Comment, Recent Cases, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1710,
1715 (1966).
For references to GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158, as support for each theory, see, for example,
Ex parte Henderson, 387 So.2d 201, 203 (ALa 1980) (referring to the psychological parent-
child relationship which had developed between child and appellees); In re Angelia,
Cal. 3d , 623 P.2d 198, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981) (noting the author's recommendations
of the least detrimental available alternative tests); In re Juvenile Appeal, 177 Conn. 648,
, 420 A.2d 875, 883 (1979) (citing psychiatrist's opinion that a babysitter had become
child's psychological parent); Rodriguez v. Koschny, 57 IMI. App. 3d 355, -, 373 N.E.2d
47, 52 (1978) (disrupting continuity of relationship between child and psychological parents
as basis for terminating natural mother's rights); In re Joseph, - Ind. App. _ 416
N.E.2d 857 (1981) (regarding the need for continuity of relationships); In re Guardianship
of D., 169 N.J. Super. 230, , 404 A.2d 663, 667 (1979) (quoting from GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 158, regarding attachment to persons providing comfort and affection - the psycholog-
ical parent); Nehra v. Uhlar, 168 N.J. Super. 187, _ 402 A.2d 264, 268 (1979) (stating
that "the real problem which transcends all other considerations still exists - namely,
whether the removal of the children from their present stable environment will harm them
psychologically . . . ."); Doe v. State, 165 N.J. Super. 392, 406, 398 A.2d 562, 569 (1979)
(noting the suggestion that the child have his own representative in litigation); In re
Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, , 319 N.E.2d 1316, 1322, 418 N.Y.S.2d 339, - (1979)
(Fuchsberg, J., concurring) (noting that had disruption of child's relationship with foster
parent occurred, natural mother could not be getting custody); Filler v. Filler, 219 N.W.2d
96, 98 (N.D. 1974) (referring to the least detrimental available alternative); Reflow v.
Reflow, 24 Or. App. 365, -, 545 P.2d 894, 899 (1976) (stressing continuity in family envi-
ronments as most important part of child's development); In re Williams, 477 Pa. 322, _,
383 A.2d 1228, 1241, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978) (regarding continuity of relationship
as important to a child); In re Tremayne, 286 Pa. Super. 480, _, 429 A.2d 40, 48 n.6
(1981) (regarding the need for continuity of relationships, especially in early childhood); In
re Kegel, 35 Wis. 2d 574, -, 271 N.W.2d 114, 120 (1978) (Abramson, J., dissenting) (not-
ing the great controversy over the psychological parent-child relationship).
172. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158, at 6, 31-40. See also NEW DEvELoPMENTs IN FOSTER CARE
AND ADOPTION, chs. 3, 6 (J.P. Triseliotis ed. 1980). In Note, Measuring the Child's Best
Interests - A Study in Incomplete Considerations, 44 DEN. L.J. 132 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Measuring], the author uses Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, N.W.2d 152, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966), as an example of the incomplete and often inappropriate con-
sideration by courts of sociological factors bearing on the question of the child's best inter-
ests. The author concludes that the Painter court's emphasis on security and stability, for
example, seemed to place a high value on mediocrity, since it may have favored stability
over possible intellectual stimulation available in the father's home. Measuring, supra this
note, at 144. For a discussion of the comparative strengths of the parental rights, best inter-
est, and psychological well-being "tests," see Alternatives, supra note 158.
173. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158, at 32-34.
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adverse effects on everything from a child's eating and sleeping
habits, to his ability to make emotional attachments, his cleanli-
ness and speech, and the possible development of dissocial and de-
linquent or criminal behavior." 4 And since terminations are per-
manent,17 5 the appropriate weighing of this factor against others
seems all the more critical.
The second suggested guideline is the child's, not the adult's,
sense of time.17 To a great extent, such a consideration seems to
be directly contrary to the normal use of legal time limits. The law
of abandonment, in which time and length of separation are most
relevant, "rests primarily on the intent of the neglecting parent,
not on the duration of his or her absence.' 17 7 Despite the extent to
which time factors are considered relevant in and of themselves,17 8
terminations usually require a specified period of time in the one
year range. 1 9 Apparently then, under many statutes' separation
grounds, the child's sense of timing and perception of the length of
separation are far less important in determining the quality of ex-
isting relationships than are arbitrary rigid time requirements.
It is self-evident that a parent facing termination may find it
important to focus on the quality of relationship developed or the
particular effects of a certain length of separation on the individual
child. While the child's age may be particularly germane to the
way in which he reacts to long term separations, these reactions
may also be a product of the individual child's intelligence, back-
ground, and life experiences. 80 Many of these factors may not
seem relevant to a parent. Thus, an attorney for the parent would
be the one most likely to bring these factors to the court's atten-
tion, thereby increasing the amount of relevant information the
court could use in making a decision.
Finally, the authors suggest that any placement decision should
take into account the law's inability to effectively supervise inter-
174. Id. at 34 & n.2.
175. See supra note 11.
176. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158, at 40-49.
177. Id. at 47 & n.25.
178. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-4(1) (Bums 1982) (requiring a minimum of six
month's separation of parent and 'rhild before a petition to terminate the relationship can
be filed with the juvenile or probate court); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-246(d)(1) (Supp. 1981)
(requiring that the child be separated from the custody of the parents for a minimum of one
year before the courts will terminate parental rights).
179. See, Family Integrity, supra note 160.
180. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158, at 10-15.
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personal relationships and to make long range predictions.181 Since
a termination of parental rights necessarily ends the relationship
between parent and child, the predictability and reliability of such
decisions is critical. In order to make an appropriate decision in
the best interests of the child, a court must be sure before termi-
nating the relationship that, if it was ever meaningful, it will not
continue to be so s2 or cannot be reestablished.1 8 3 Furthermore,
predictability is enhanced by a close and careful look at the emo-
tional stability of both the child and the parent or parents; and
therefore, a careful and detailed professional evaluation of both
may be critical.
It is clear that these specific guidelines have not been enthusias-
tically embraced by all courts hearing termination cases. Neverthe-
less, granting even marginal validity to these theories suggests that
adequate and zealous representation8 ' of the rights of the involved
parents should include at least a consideration of these factors. An
approach suggesting that any case which appropriately considers
these factors is "not complicated" 18 and does not involve any
"specially troublesome points of law"1'' is both too naive and too
callous to effectively consider the child's best interests.
V. THE INHERENT RISK OF ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION OF A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
At least one commentator has suggested that the Lassiter deci-
sion reflects an unwillingness by the Supreme Court to reverse Ms.
Lassiter's termination based solely on the trial court's failure to
appoint counsel, especially since the evidence favoring termination
was so strong and compelling.18 7 Since it is anything but certain
181. Id. at 49-52.
182. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-246(d) (Supp. 1981).
183. Id.
184. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6, DR 6-
101(A)(2) (1980).
185. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981).
186. Id.
187. Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to Counsel
after Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 218 (1981). The author cites the Court's
own criticisms of Petitioner's apparent lack of concern for her son:
Here, the trial court had previously found that Ms. Lassiter had expressly declined
to appear at the 1975 child custody hearing, Ms. Lassiter had not even bothered to
speak to her retained lawyer after being notified of the termination hearing, and the
court specifically found that Ms. Lassiter's failure to make an effort to contest the
termination proceeding was without cause.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33. But see id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), in which Justice Black-
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that all cases will be that strong in favor of termination, the second
part of the "erroneous deprivation" test becomes particularly im-
portant. The question is whether an appellate court's finding that
counsel should have been appointed will ever warrant a reversal
solely on that ground. To address this question, it will be necessary
to examine, once again, the time involved in a termination pro-
ceeding and its effect on the child. It then becomes clear that,
given the prevalence of such theories as "psychological
parenthood"188 and "common law adoptive parents" '189 and the em-
phasis on ongoing relationships with the child, it may well be im-
prudent, as well as contrary to the best interests of the child, to
reverse the decision on appeal after the child has already spent a
great deal of time away from his parents.
Examination of this problem may best be done by tracing a ter-
mination case through its typical stages. More often than not, a
termination case is heard in two stages, one fact finding and the
other dispositional.90 The fact finding has often taken place in the
context of a proceeding to determine whether the child in question
is deprived,'O neglected, 192 abused, 93 in need of supervision,'19 or
lacking parental supervision.' 95 Often, once a finding of need is
mun noted: "Petitioner has plainly not led the life of the exemplary citizen or model par-
ent. . . . But the issue before the Court is not petitioner's character; it is whether she was
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard when the state moved to terminate absolutely
her parental rights." (citations omitted).
188. See Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949
(1966) (first major case which used this theory explicitly); Sorentino v. Family and Chil-
dren's Soc'y, 74 N.J. 313, 378 A.2d 18 (1977), aff'd, 77 N.J. 483, 391 A.2d 497 (1978); (where
the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether to return a child to
her natural mother, following a finding that the mother's consent for adoption was void,
when the child had been in the custody of the adoptive parents from one month after birth
to thirty-one months later). Stating the issue as whether transferring custody to the plaintiff
(mother) would raise the probability of serious harm to the child, the court held that cus-
tody should be granted to the adoptive parents with the case remanded to consider the
question of terminating the mother's parental rights. Though no specific mention was made
of GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158, or the phrase "psychological parenthood," the court noted
that "the Sorentinos have had no existing relationship (save one of blood) with the
child.... Here the passage of time permitted the roots [to the adoptive parents] to be
nurtured and to develop fully." 74 N.J. at -, 378 A.2d at 23.
189. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158, at 27-28, 98, 108-10.
190. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-4-4-15(f), 31-6-5-4 (West 1979); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. §
623 (McKinney 1975).
191. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802(g)(1) (1981); UNr. JuvENILE CouRT ACT, § 47.
192. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-283(A)(1), -283(B)(1) (RepL VoL 1982).
193. See W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(6) (1980).
194. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
195. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3(a)(1) (Burns Supp. 1982).
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made, the child is then placed in the custody of the state welfare
agency,198 or in an institution or foster home. At this point, there
may be regular reviews of the situation to determine whether the
child's deprivation is likely to continue or the prospects of rehabili-
tation197 of the family are sufficiently minimal to warrant sever-
ance of the parent-child relationship. Thus, by the time the trial
court examines the question of termination the parent and child
may have already been separated, with or without continuing su-
pervision and counseling in the interim,198 for a rather lengthy pe-
riod of time.
Indeed, in Ms. Lassiter's case, she and her son had not even
communicated with one another for several years by the time the
termination question was heard. 99 It is true that Ms. Lassiter's im-
prisonment presented an extraordinary situation in this regard,
but the actual reason for the separation may not be relevant. The
question that arises with Ms. Lassiter's case and others is whether
the lengthy separation itself would produce the type of relation-
ship between her son and foster parents that would warrant termi-
nating the relationship with his mother solely because of the
length of separation and the quality of the bond between the child
and his present caretakers.0 0 It is this risk, that the separation
time considered in conjunction with the best interests of the child
will necessitate termination on its own, that makes the failure to
require counsel so devastating.
Unfortunately a finding that the trial court erred on the ques-
tion of appointment of counsel may be made too late to be reme-
died adequately. Unless the agency involved has made a concerted
effort to counsel both parent and child20 1 during the entire process,
196. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2301(a)(2)(iii) (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-16(e) (Burns
Supp. 1982).
197. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-19(b)(2) (Burns Supp. 1982).
198. See In re Welfare of Solomon, 291 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 1980).
199. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 21, 23.
200. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See also Drum-
mond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978), in which the foster parents maintained that during the
time they kept a foster child, mutual feelings of love and dependence developed. They fur-
ther asserted the existence of rights accorded traditional family units. Naturally, they
claimed to be the child's "psychological parents." The court held, however, that no such
constitutionally protected rights existed in that case. For further discussion of the effects of
long term foster care, see J. GOLDsTEnI, A. FREuD, & A. SOLNrr, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHiMD (1979) [hereinafter cited as FREUD].
201. According to the Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina, once the state moves
for termination, it "has made a decision that the child cannot go home and should not go
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the breakdown of the family unit may be a fait accompi2 =2 by the
time the decision is appealed. Even with extensive counseling it
may occur, especially with a very young child.
It is therefore in the child's best interests to attach to the trial
court proceeding every safeguard of reliability possible. Otherwise,
an initially inappropriate termination may be made with the result
that it ultimately becomes unwise or impossible to reunite the fam-
ily. On the other hand, it may well be that an appropriately
granted termination will lead to a lengthy and difficult appeals
process, perhaps resulting in a reversal that is made solely because
the appellate court is unsure about whether the complete and most
important arguments, inferences, and proven facts were produced
at trial. This lengthy period of uncertainty, during which the child
may be the subject of unwarranted placement changes and
trauma,03 will obviously be contrary to the child's best interests.0 4
Use of the psychological parenthood theories of Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit again illustrates the inherent complexity of any
decision which is truly made in the best interests of the child. Of
course, the factors enumerated in their book are applicable not
only to termination cases, but also to any placement 0 5 decision af-
fecting a child. But the finality and severity which accompany a
decision to terminate necessarily make those factors both more im-
portant and more complex.
At this point it is best to review some of the basic premises re-
lied upon by the authors and by some courts to examine the extent
to which an erroneous termination and resulting extended separa-
tion may affect a family which, although not ideal, nevertheless
need not be destroyed. First, however, it should be reiterated that
the "best interests test" is utilized because courts recognize their
special duty as a result of the parens patriae20 1 power, to insure the
well-being and development of those incapable of managing and
home. It no longer has an obligation to try and restore that family.... "Lassiter, 452 U.S.
at 47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Record at 40).
202. Usually the child will not be adopted pending appeal. See Muench & Levy, Psycho-
logical Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 FAm. L.Q. 129, 181 (1979) (discussing s.uggestion that
once the state has acted to remove a child from his house, placing him in foster care, the
bond with his psychological parents, if developed, should not be disturbed).
203. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158, passim.
204. See id. at 36, 39.
205. See id. at 5, 7-8, 31-52.
206. For a rather extensive treatment of the origins of the doctrine, see Rendleman,
Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. Rav. 205 (1971).
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controlling their own affairs. 207 Clearly, most courts recognize this
power and the best interests of the child to be superior to any in-
herent fundamental rights of the parents.20 8
In order to act in the child's best interests, the courts must be
cognizant of these premises and facts and act in accordance with
them. According to the authors and many other authorities, every
child has a need for continuity of affectionate and stimulating rela-
tionships with an adult or adults. This continuity and the strength
of ongoing relationships are apparently more important than a
blood relationship, since children have no conception of such.20 9
Thus, events leading up to a child's birth are largely irrelevant to
the child in terms of his emotional development. Most important
to the child are the day to day interchanges with the adults who
take care of him or her.210 On the strength of these interchanges,
the person in whose care the child is more likely to develop satis-
factorily is the one to whom the child becomes attached through
the knowledge that this particular person tends to his or her every-
day needs, both emotional and physical." Accordingly, the role of
a "psychological parent" can be fulfilled by anyone who is the reg-
ular caring adult; but it is never filled by the absent or inactive
person.1 2
Obviously, then, there is a need to determine what is meant by
an "absent" or "inactive" parent. The common and statutory law
in this country probably closely approaches defining the "absent"
or "inactive" parent within the concept of abandonment. While
this elusive standard may take intent 23 into account more than
any other potential ground for termination, it is also often tied to a
specific time frame. The standard is further complicated by the
fact that the reason for the absence of the parent in the first in-
stance may also be considered relevant. 1
4
207. See Singleman, A Case of Neglect: Parens Patriae Versus Due Process in Child
Neglect Proceedings, 17 ARiz. L. Rv. 1055, 1058 nn.18-21 (1975).
208. See, e.g., Lennon v. State, 193 Kan. 685, , 396 P.2d 290, 294 (1964).
209. GoLDSTEN, supra note 158, at 12.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 19.
213. See, e.g., TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1) (Vernon 1975).
214. In re Juvenile Action No. S-264, 126 Ariz. 488, 616 P.2d 948 (1980). The state sought
to terminate the parental rights of an imprisoned father who did not communicate with his
children for three years before the action was filed. In affirming the dismissal of the state's
case, the Supreme Court of Arizona emphasized the fact that the father chose not to contact
his children for reasons which included his inability to communicate well. The court held:
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Many psychologists and experts in the field of child develop-
ment, however, find that neither the reasons for separation nor the
specific length of separation are necessarily determinative of what
is in the best interests of the child. This factor alone explains the
reluctance of some courts to utilize "psychological parenthood"
theories. In Hoy v. Wills, 215 for instance, the trial court virtually
disregarded all of the expert's opinion regarding the formation of a
psychological parenthood bond solely because the expert stated
that a child who had been kidnapped and kept away from his par-
ents for a great deal of time might then be more appropriately
placed in the custody of the kidnappers, who had become the
child's psychological parents.21 Many authorities feel that the
most important factors are the positive nature of the new relation-
ship, the continuity in the child's life, and the lack of continuing
closeness with the biological parent.
These factors all combine to leave a court in search of some ap-
propriate guidelines to follow. At least three appropriate guidelines
are suggested by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit. The first they sug-
gest is that placement decisions should safeguard the child's need
for continuity of relationships. This is especially troublesome in
light of the Lassiter holding. If, as the authors suggest, instability
of all mental processes during the period of development needs to
be offset by stability and uninterrupted support,1 the appeals
process with its inherent chance of modification or reversal, can
only increase instability.218 It may be aggravated by haphazard fos-
ter care placements, which are sometimes characterized by rela-
The term abandon[ment] must be somewhat elastic and questions of abandonment
and intent are questions of fact for the resolution of the trial court .... Although the
best interests of the child are a valid factor in deciding an abandonment allegation,
abandonment cannot be predicated solely on the best interests of the child. The ap-
propriate test is "whether there has been conduct on the part of the parent which
implies a conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to the child, leading
to the destruction of the parent-child relationship."
Id. at 950 (citations omitted).
215. 165 N.J. Super. 265, 398 A.2d 109 (1978).
216. Id. at 270, 398 A.2d at 111.
217. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158, at 31-40.
218. As a consequence, the authors propose the following rule regarding timely hearings
and appeals:
Trials and appeals should be conducted as rapidly as is consistent with responsible
decisionmaking. The court shall establish a timetable for hearing, decision, and re-
view on appeal, which, in accord with the specific child's sense of time ... shall
maximize the chances of all interested parties to have their substantive claims heard
while still viable, and shall minimize the disruption of parent-child relationships....
Id. at 24.
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tionships that are too distant219 or perhaps too close.220 This is es-
pecially troublesome because in many cases the foster parents
want to adopt, and cling stubbornly to the child,221 only to be
forced after a great lapse of time to return the child to his natural
parents.
Perhaps it is the second guideline,222 however, which poses even
greater problems. The authors, who clearly believe that a child's
age affects his need for stability, his ability to cope with absence,
and his sense of time, suggest that placement decisions should re-
flect the child's sense of time, rather than the adult's. This seems
to be most appropriately applied to the abandonment question.
But even in the absence of behavior that most courts would char-
acterize as abandonment, the extended separation of parent and
child during the litigation and appeals process may lead to the
same result. The child may see his lack of interaction with his
"real" parent as something akin to an abandonment of him. A
child is said to be "not sufficiently matured to enable him to use
thinking to hold on to the parent he has lost. 223 This can have far
reaching effects. For instance, the authors suggest that for a child
under five years an absence of parents for more than two months is
beyond comprehension. They conclude that the "procedural and
substantive decisions should never exceed the time that the child-
to-be-placed can endure loss and uncertainty. '224 Certainly an ap-
peal with the concomitant possibility of a reversal or remand in-
creases uncertainty, especially when courts stay any further action
until the appellate remedies of the parent are exhausted.
The third guideline recognizes that courts are hard pressed to
supervise the sometimes tenuous relationship between parent and
219. Id. at 23-26.
220. Id. at 26.
221. For an extreme example of this kind of obstinate refusal to return a child to her
rightful parents, see Grimes v. Yack, 289 Pa. Super. 495, 433 A.2d 1363 (1981). The adoptive
parents attempted to keep a child, though the consent for adoption had been revoked by the
natural mother. The adoptive parents, while pressing their claim for adoption of the child,
attempted to have the court rule on the issue as if it were a custody case and thus focus on
the best interests of the child, rather than the right of the mother to have her child returned
to her. The court emphasized that this was an adoption proceeding, rather than a custody
case, and was therefore not appropriate for a pure "best interest of the child" inquiry; how-
ever, the psychological parenthood argument was adamantly urged both by the appellant
and amici.
222. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 158.
223. Id. at 40. See also FREuD, supra note 200, at 39-57.
224. Id. at 42.
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child during this period of relative uncertainty. It also recognizes
that some decisions, once made, are then beyond the possibility of
sensible and meaningful correction. This guideline has perhaps
been the most controversial part of the theories of psychological
parenthood, at least those expressly advanced by Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit. The authors make an attempt to keep in perspective
the notion that the law is inherently incapable of supervising inter-
personal relationships. They assert that the law "may be able to
destroy human relationships, but it does not have the power to
compel them to develop. 225 Thus, the likelihood that supervised
visitation and the like will prevent a total and irreversible family
breakdown in a manner consistent with the child's best interests is
probably not very high.
Thus, a typical scenario may unfold as follows. On a given date,
the parent is served with notice that his parental rights will be
terminated because he or she has failed to provide proper and nec-
essary parental care and protection to his or her children. Within
the appropriate statutory time period, the parent appears in the
juvenile court which has jurisdiction. Appearing before the judge,
the indigent parent is asked whether he has counsel to represent
him. Since he cannot afford to retain counsel, the court proceeds to
weigh the various interests at hand to decide whether appointment
of counsel is mandated by Lassiter. Upon a review of the pleadings
and the reports in the file, the court finds that the case presents no
especially complex points of law and that the state does not intend
to call any expert witnesses. Based on a review of all of these fac-
tors, the court declines to appoint counsel for the indigent parent.
Finding that the state has met its burden of proof, the court ter-
minates the parent-child relationship, placing the child in a foster
home during the appropriate appeal period, assuming the child
was not already in temporary care before the institution of this
action. Some time after the final order is entered, the parent is
able to retain counsel for the purpose of appeal. During the period
between the hearing and the appellate decision, which is often sub-
stantial, the parent and the child are neither counseled nor en-
couraged or allowed to visit with one another.2
225. Id. at 50.
226. Evidence indicates that the lack of contact between children in foster care and their
natural parents is closely related to poor emotional adjustment and delayed return home.
This lack of contact may well confuse the child and lead to insecurity about his personal
identity. Moreover, it seems evident that even when rehabilitation of the family is not a
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At the first level of appeal the termination is affirmed, the ap-
pellate court finding that there is substantial evidence to support
the finding of the juvenile court. On appeal to the highest court of
the state, or beyond, it is held that counsel should have been ap-
pointed in the first instance. The original decision made by the
juvenile court and sustained by the intermediate appellate court is
reversed. The juvenile court now appoints counsel to represent the
parent in a proceeding where the entire purpose of the proceeding
is ostensibly to act in the best interests of the child.
The juvenile court is now presented with an impossible dilemma.
If the parent-child relationship was not an ideal one in the first
place, and perhaps warranted a finding that the family was in need
of some help, what should now be done if the child has formed a
significant emotional attachment with his foster parents? What if
those foster parents have now become the "psychological parents"
of the child? Should the court ignore the best interests of the child
and destroy the relationship that has formed during the extensive
appeal period? Or should it ignore what is clearly the right of the
parent to raise his own child? Even if the child's best interests out-
weigh the rights of the parents, is it in the best interests of the
child to destroy his relationship with his parent or parents and
possibly his siblings at this point?
The appointment of counsel in the first instance, of course,
would not guarantee that this would never happen. It would, how-
ever, increase the likelihood that alternative theories are
presented, that procedural and substantive questions are fully ex-
plored, and that necessary expert testimony regarding the com-
plexities of the parent-child relationship is presented for the fullest
possible consideration in the juvenile court the first time.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that there are at least three serious problems with
both the reasoning employed in and the ramifications of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Lassiter. First, the Court has taken a
rather restrictive view of the scope of its earlier decisions regarding
the constitutional right of indigent citizens to have attorneys ap-
pointed at state cost to represent their own interests. The Court
realistic possibility, contact with the child's parents is of positive value to the child's sense
of identity and self worth. Naw DEVELOPMENTS IN FosTER CARE AND ADOPTION, supra note
172.
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has clearly created and sanctified a presumption that such a right
applies only in cases where the party's physical liberty is at stake.
This presumption is obviously one of considerable strength when
considered in conjunction with other appropriate balancing factors.
It is also manifest that the Supreme Court has a great deal of
latitude in weighing the three components of the Mathews due
process test. In Lassiter, the Court acknowledged the low priority
of the state's economic interests and the high priority of the funda-
mental rights involved. Yet, the Court failed to take account of the
fact that the structure and nature of most parental termination
proceedings often leave the parent virtually incapable of ade-
quately addressing the issues raised. The combination of exceed-
ingly malleable grounds, lax evidentiary and procedural standards,
and relatively low standards of proof required, unnecessarily in-
fringes upon the parent's rights to notice and fair play. This jeop-
ardizes the child's best interests, as well as the interests of the par-
ent. Appointment of counsel would enhance not only the fairness
of the proceedings, but also the reliability of results.
Finally, the recent adherence by many courts to theories of psy-
chological parenthood and similar concepts ultimately increases
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the rights of both the parent
and the child involved. This risk becomes intolerably high in pa-
rental termination suits when an indigent parent is denied the
right to appointed counsel. This risk has two distinct parts. First,
there is the danger that the absence of counsel will result in an
adversarial hearing that is not adversarial at all, at least not in its
most desirable form. This stems from the likelihood that the hear-
ing may not be conducted as zealously and creatively as possible.
Hence the risk of not obtaining the best possible resolution would
be unnecessarily increased, especially in light of the seemingly low
cost of appointing counsel. Secondly, and perhaps more signifi-
cantly, the risk created by not requiring the presence of counsel is
closely related to the relative stability of the family at question. In
other words, because the relationship between parent and child
may deteriorate beyond repair during the litigation process itself,
the lack of counsel may significantly increase the chances that the
decision made by the trial court on the merits of the termination
petition will have to be affirmed by an appellate court, regardless
of its true merit.
It therefore seems more sensible, more humane, and more pro-
tective of the rights of all persons involved in a termination pro-
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ceeding to attach to the original action every feasible and afforda-
ble indicia of reliability. The presence of an attorney to represent
the rights of the parents is an appropriate way of making this en-
tire process both fairer and more reliable.

